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"Ambition lies at the heart of politics ," says Joseph A. Schlesinger 1 as he
begins to describe his ambition theory of politics. His central assumption is
that a politician 's behavior is a complex of responses to his office goals. The
politician's choices and decisions are made to enhance his chances to fulfill his
office ambitions. If he wants to seek advancement in elective office "he must
act today in terms of the electorate of the office which he hopes to win
tomorrow ." 2 We will not try to explain why politicians seek advancement.
Schlesinger says, "The small band of governors in sizeable and competitive
states and the conspicuous members of the Senate who together compose the
presidential 'hopefuls' are hopeful as much because of the expectations of
others as because of their own. "3
The dust of electoral conflict had barely settled after the 1968 election
when speculation began about who would be the Democratic presidential
nominee in 1972. Despite the apparent availability and popularity of Edward
Kennedy, the possibility of a relatively open contest for the Democratic
nomination unconstrained by a Democrat in the White House was apparent to
all. For most aspirants the chance to have a "good shot" at the presidency is
likely to be small. This is particularly true for an aspirant in the majority party
because an incumbent president may control the nomination of his successor,
or it may pass through succession to the Vice President. Humphrey 's defeat in
1968 could not help but whet the appetites of numerous Democrats for the
highest political office in the land.
The institutional base for many presidential hopefuls in 1969 was the
United States Senate. All presidential nominees of the 1960's had previously
been Senators. The Senate obviously provides a potential candidate a forum
for addressing the public , for proposing policy alternatives, and for keeping in
•we wish to thank Char les 0. Jon es, Eric M. Uslander, and James W. Lindeen for their
constructive remarks on an earlier version of this pap er.
1Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago : Rand Mc ally and
Company, 1966), p. 1. For the implications of candidates' ambitions on party organization , see
Schlesinger , "Po litical Party Organization," in James G. March (ed.) , Handbook of Organizations
(Chicago: Rand Mc ally and Company , 1965), pp. 764-801.
2 Schlesinger, ibid ., p. 6.
3Ibid.

AMBITION THEORY AND PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS

53

constant touch with the issues of the day. It also gives Senators ample
opportunity to accommodate their senatorial behavior to their presidential
ambitions. They can do this in a variety of ways: by public statements , bill
introductions , investigative activities , challenging the President's nominees
to the courts and administrative positions, and the like. One kind of behavior
particularly amenable to comparative analysis is their roll call voting records.
This is the data base to which we will direct our attention .
The matter of identifying Senators ' ambitions for the Presidency is one of
some difficulty . Perhaps it is true , as former Senator Everett Dirksen once
noted on a TV talk show , that every Senator at one time or another harbors the
notion that he or she could achieve the top political prize. Arbitrarily we have
chosen to identify as our pool of aspirants the Senators of the 91st Congress
(1969-70) who made conspicuous steps toward obtaining that nomination ;
namely , McGovern , Muskie , Kennedy , Hartke , Bayh, Jackson, McCarthy ,
Harris and Hughes. These put themselves forward , responded coyly to inquiries about their interest in the office, and, in some instances, formally
declared for the Presidency . These we submit , can be expected to have
accommodated their behavior , and , in particular, their roll call voting to the
scrutiny of a national constituency during their concurrent service in the 91st
Congress . It remains true , of course , that other Democratic hopefuls may
similarly have adapted their voting to the same end but when opportunity
came , they did not put themselves forward. On the other hand, the openness
of the Democratic scramble and the array of men actually considered as active
aspirants leads us to think that such serreptitious aspirants can be safely
discounted .
Drawing upon Schlesinger's ambition theory, we expect that the Senators
who are presidential aspirants will distinguish themselves from their colleagues who are content to serve their states and constituents on a continuing
basis. The aspirants will have to look and act presidential. Some of this may
seem only to be vain posturing, the kind of puffery that critics of the American
political style righteously protest. 4 More than that, the aspirants must obtain
the hue of a national figure , above the parochial identifications of a state or
particular region . Interestingly , however, the aspirants will not be particularly different from one another on the issues. Particularly on the general
issues of governmental management, social welfare, civil liberties and rights
the candidates all seek moderate ground in the liberal-labor, northern urban
majority of the Democratic Party. Differences from one another will basically
be in style and rhetoric , not substance.
On the other hand, nonaspirants will vary from one another. Their future
constituency remains their states. Although , as Matthews pointed out ,
4
For exampl e, see Michael Parenti , Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin 's Press ,
1974), pp . 141-155 and pa ssim .
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Senators have some discretion in defining the constituency they will serve,
constituency characteristics are associated with senatorial voting. 5 Men who
wish to remain in the Senate will have particularistic concerns about federal
assistance programs , school desegregation plans , tax credits for certain industries , agricultural support level , and the like . Presidential aspirants will be
anticipating the same national constituency. They will respond to and vote for
the policy proposals in relation to preferences in their national political party
of the electorate at large. We do not expect candidates to distinguish themselves from one another sharply. It is unlikely that an aspirant will be nominated because of his record on the issues - the issue alone are not of first
importance - rather , one may be disqualified for having an "unacceptable"
record on one or more salient national issues.
Our hypothesis can be disconfirmed by two kinds of senatorial voting
behavior . Aspirants may not vote similarly on particular issue positions. They
may choose contrasting positions because they act out of different perceptions
of what is right , popular , workable or reasonable. Perhaps the aspirants do not
feel constrained to behave similarly in anticipation of the national constituency. Such a finding would suggest that candidates perceive the electorate
and/or their party 's supporters as a diverse constituency for which numerous
viable trategies might be devised to put together a winning coalition. Candidates would then be likely to communicate sp cific appeals for support to
distinct interests- Southerners, blacks , labor, youth, the doves , and the like.
Substantial disagreement among the candidates on the dimensions of policy
would disconfirm our hypothesis .
The hypothesis would be disconfirmed if all Democratic Senators vote
similarly. If there is little variance among aspirants, but likewi e little among
nonaspirants , our theory is meaningless. However , party unity is hardly a
hallmark of Senate Democrats . 6 It is true , of course, that much of the disunity
in the voting of Senate Democrats reflects the traditional cleavage between
the South and the rest of the country's Democrats. For ambition theory to be
at all persuasive we need to show that the aspirants, who are all non-southern
Democrats, vote more homogeneously than their nonaspirant colleagues from
outside the South . 7
Having noted the Democrats' regional cleavage , it is worth suggesting that
ambition theory has some explanatory and possibly predictive relevance to the
voting of Southern members of Congress. George C. Wallac not withstand5Donald R. Matthews , U.S. Senators and Their World ( ew York: Random House , 1960),
pp. 230-239. Clausen , with greater precision , indicates that constituency is more ignificant than
party on senatorial voting on civil liberties and interna tional involvement issues. See Aage R.
Clausen, How Congressmen Decide: A Policy Focus ( ew York: St. Martin 's Press , 1974), pp .
140-149 .
6 See , for example , David B. Truman , The Congressional Party : A Case Study ( ew York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1959), especially Pf · 51-63.
7 See Malcolm E. Jewe ll and Samue C. Patter son, The Legislative Process in the United
States , 2d ed . ( ew York: Random Hou se, 1973), pp. 454-455 .
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ing, Southern politicians have had little realistic basis for pursuing presidential aspirations in the Democratic party . Most political commentators would
agree that , except for their loyalty to traditional, southern lifestyle and values,
Senators such as Russell of Georgia and Fulbright of Arkansas would have
been considered promising presidential timber . Because they maintained
positions on race related issues which were at variance with what was acceptable to the national constituency, especially the national Democratic constituency , efforts to pursue such aspirations were bound to fail. Of course,
southern Democratic Senators have been shown to be "different " on issues
besides race related ones, 8 but chances are that their issue positions would
have been more tractable if the presidency constituted a real career opportunity . Because the presidency is not available, southern Democrats can be
conservative or moderate on many social reform issues or exact a price from
the party or President who needs their vote - military bases , defense
contracts, agricultural subsidies, favorable consideration on bureaucratic decisions affecting local interests , pork, and other tangible benefits. Until th e re
is a convergence of values between the North and South on attitudes toward
race, or until the salience of this issue recedes , or until a southern aspirant
forswears traditional racial values of his region , a Southerner cannot be a
viable presidential candidate. In the absence of this office opportunity, presidential ambitions will not constrain southern Democratic Senators to accommodate themselves to national values and interests .
Our theory does not insist that aspirants must necessarily change their
views on issues . It may be that their issue positions have been both consistent
over time , and apt for a presidential candidacy. It does suggest that change
might occur in some aspirants. Our empirical tests make no attempt to detect
change over time. If the results of this study are persuasive , a longitudinal
inquiry into senatorial voting behavior to ascertain change over time might be
in order. It may well be that the decision to seek the presidency is the
watershed for new voting patt erns . This question goes beyond the scope of th e
inquiry which follows.

METHODS OF INQUIRY
The data base for our inquiry consists of 40 cumulative scales or dimensions
of Senate voting in the 91st Congress (1969-70). Beginning with 666 roll call
votes, we eliminated 162 in which the minority did not exceed ten percent of
those voting on roll call. Using techniques suggested by MacRae, we mad e
pairwise comparisons of each roll call with every other as measured with Yules
8 H . Douglas Price, "Are Southern Democrats Differen t? An Application of Scale Analysis to
Senate Voting Patterns, " in Nelson W. Polsby , Robert A. Dent ler and Paul A. Smith (eds. ),
Politics and Social Life (Boston : Houghton -M illin Company , 1963), pp. 740-756.
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Q coefficient. 9 We defined clusters of four or more roll calls in which each roll
call included was related to every other with a coefficient ;;e,:±.8. 10 We
identified 40 clusters encompassing 408 roll calls, leaving 96 roll calls unclustered . The roll calls in each cluster were organized into cumulative scales and
Senators wer e assigned scale scores on each dimension of voting.
Th e scaling technique is objective, but identifying the content of the scales
is not . Inst ead of a prior prediction of relationships among issues being tested ,
we must account for roll calls that are empirically related. The labels and
desc riptions of the dimensions are based upon our interpretations of the
public descriptions of the roll calls, especially those contained in the Congr essio nal Quart erly and the Con gress ional Reco rd , and occasionally
supplemented by information and interpr etations in news periodicals. 11 We
note with caution the fact that the dimensions themselves are in some instances highly related and that the distinctions between th em can be fine or
ambiguou . Howev er, each dimension constitutes a unique distribution of
scale scores for th e memb er of the Senat e.
Although all members of the Senate were assigned scores, our interest
centers upon th e scores for Democrats . For purposes of our exploration the
measur es are treated as if they are interval scales of measurement . Our
primary interest is in whether or not there is more homogeneity in the voting
of the aspirant Senators than those who are not aspirants. Statistically then we
simply want to compare the variance of the voting scores of the two groups.
Previous resea rch suggests that comparisons be made to "All Democrats" and
nonsouthern Democrats. f! ecause our aspirant group is relatively small we
will examin e individual scores to indicate whether or not particular aspirants
were deviating from the aspirant group means . Finally , because our scores
measure dir ection of voting we will also compare the mean scores of the
groups of Senators..J

FINDI GS
The data in Table 1 indicat e that on most of the dimensions of voting there
is sub tantially more homog eneity in the scores of the presidential aspirant
Senators than in those of the nonaspirant Senators . A comparision of aspirants
with all nonaspirants shows that on 37 of 40 dimensions the coefficients of
variance for aspirants are smaller than those of th eir counterparts. Even when
9 Duncan MacRae, Jr ., "A Method for Ide ntifying Issues and Factions from Legislative
Votes," American Political cience Review 59, o. 4 (Dece mb er 1965), 909-926. Th e trea tme nt of
issues is elabora ted in chapt ers 2 and 3 of MacRae's Issues and Parties in Le[!,islative Voting:
Methods of Statistical Analysis (New York: Harper and Row, Publi hers, 1970).
1°1'his thr es hold leve l of .80 sets a minimum Q value which eliminat es roll calls from th e
cluster which are only minim ally related to th e other roll calls in th e cluste r. Additionall y, the .80
minimum Q value produced Guttman scales with littl e error and is compar able to th e req uir ement of .90+ leve l of rep rodu cib ility. See Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W . Watt s, Jr . and Allen R.
Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston : Northw es te rn University Press , 1966), p. 103.
''Coefficients of reproducibility and a description of th e issues in th e dim ens ions are
reported in Appendix A .
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aspirants are compared only with their nonsouthern counterparts their voting
is more homogeneous on 33 of 40 voting dimensions.
One way of comparing the variance in scale scores of the groups is to report
the ratio between the variance of nonaspirants and that of aspirants for each
scale. On scale 1, for example, the variance for all nonaspirants is 44.02
compared to 0.69 for aspirants . The ratio exceeds 63 to l. Comparing nonaspirants outside the South (variance = 9. 76) with the apsirants yields a ration
exceeding 14 to l. Table 2 reports four categories of ratios. For category A
ratios equal or exceed 10 to l. In B the ratio equals or exceeds 2 to l but is less
than 10 to l. In C the ratio equals or exceeds l to l but is less than 2 to l. In
category D variance for the aspirants exceeds that for the nonaspirant group.
From Table 2 it is apparent that , as anticipated, the contrast in
homogeneity of voting is sharper when all nonaspirant Senators are compared
to the aspirants than when the comparison is between nonaspirants outside
the South and the aspirants. Half the dimensions in category A for all nonaspirants appear in B for nonaspirants outside the South. Six dimensions in
category B for all nonaspirants appear in C for nonaspirants outside the South.
The results are similar for all categories. Referring back to Table 1, the reader
can find that variances in column 4 exceed those in column 7 for all but nine
dimensions and that in all of the nine the differences are modest.
There is remarkably little variance in the voting distributions of the
aspirants on the 40 policy dimensions . On only five dimensions does the
variance coefficient for the presidential candidates exceed 3. 00. The variance
is highest on dimension 11, the Anti-military Expansionism scale. Eight of the
nine aspirants ' scores are between 8.5 and 10.0, showing them to be opponents of military expansion. Senator Jackson, however , is sharply distingished
from the others with a score of 0. 0, showing strong support for the military.
Second most variance occurs on dimension 18, Taxpayers Savings and Congressional Budget Austerity. Votes in the dimension were to cut NASA
spending , tighten spending and audit controls on defense contracts and
reduce the total spending authorization for the Defense Department for fiscal
year 1971. Seven of the eight Senators scored supported austerity with scores
of six, seven or eight . Senator Jackson's score was one. Dimension 27 is called
Tax Reform #2 and includes roll calls on amendments and passage of the Tax
Geform Act ofl969 . Most Senators supported reform with scores between 5.0
and 7.0 , but McCarthy and Hartke had scores of2.0. On dimension 32, Tax
Subsidy Reform , the issues concerned reform of mineral depletion allowances
and reduction of the maximum receivable by farmers for farm subsidies. High
scorers favored subsidy reductions and low scorers opposed. The candidates
were spread on this dimension ; Harris had the lowest score of0.0 , Hartke and
McCarthy had 1.0, McGovern and Muskie registered 3.0 and Hughes and
Bayh wer e the strongest opponents of subsidies and depletion allowances with
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TABLE 1. Means and Variances of Three Sets of Democratic Senators
NONASPIRANTS
Scale
Non South ern
Score
All
Mean Varian ce
M ean Varian ce
Rang e
0N
Sco,-e
S2
N
Scorn
S2
Scale
(7)
(3)
(5)
(6)
(8)
(1)
(2)
(4)
14.79
9.76
10.51
44.02 31
17 47
1
5.11
15.39
13.95 32
17.47
2
20 48
27.68
73.52 32 17.38
21 48 12.625
3
6.66 28
3.93
6. 16
2.94
4
7 42
1.42
6.26
12.54 29
8.48
5
10 43
4.17
15.18 30 14.28
16 45
12.17
6
2.35
7.50
12. 19 30
9.52
7
11 46
7.64
10.72
17.06 28
5.32
8
11 44
7. 10
0.90
6.68
1.51 25
8 40
9
1.82
2.50
1.35 17
2.09
4 31
10
7.07
9.44
5.73
11.73 30
11
10 45
3. 10
2.44
4.98
8.68 31
12
9 47
0.96
3.79 31
1.07
13
11 46
1.89
3.34 25
3.20
3.10
6 38
2.45
14
4.96
0.71
0.58 27
6 41
5.06
15
7.06
6.69 30
3.55
7 45
2.98
16
6.02
1.41
4.66
6.31 31
17
7 46
5.05
8.37
3.74
10.27 20
18
8 33
2.81
1.43
4 37
2.27
1.77 24
19
0.67
1.22 26
2.42
20
4 38
1.99
4.38
0.61
21
3.60
2.33 32
5 48
1.73
1.88
2.11
1.62 20
22
4 33
2.02 29
0.78
0.73
23
1.38
6 43
2.18
2.62
24
2.98
3. 13 28
5 43
3 .31
4.62
25
4.97
9.42 29
9 43
2.17
2.74 29
3 .88
26
3.16
6 44
4.65 29
5.24
2.32
27
7 43
4.36
4.24
0.72
4.22
0.84 21
28
5 36
3. 19 28
1.60
29
2. 10
1.30
5 41
2.53
3.24
2.69 29
3 .57
30
5 44
1.20
1.28
0.88 26
1.33
4 41
31
4.75
2. 18
4.02 23
2.78
32
9 39
1.77
1. 73 28
1.71
33
4 41
1.33
o·.10
1.58
34
4 41
0.55
1.29 27
2.60
2.41
1.77
2.94 20
4 34
35
1.19
4 34
1.47
1.00 21
1.79
36
1.54
0.89
0.87 26
37
3 42
1.83
1.40
2.07
1.69 19
1.74
4 30
38
2.80
2.22 15
1.93
2.03
4 26
39
2.72
0.64
2.49
0.97 27
40
3 39

on the 40 Dimensions
ASPIRANTS
N
(9)
9
9
9
7
8
8
9
9
6
6
9
9
9
4
8
9
8
8
7
7
9
3
9
8
6
8
9
6
8
6
6
7
8
7
5
5
7
4
5
5

Mean
Scor e
(10)
16.50
18.78
20.06
5.86
9.50
15.56
10.39
10. 17
7.42
1.50
8.50
1.89
1.17
4.00
5.44
5 .89
6.06
6.75
3.21
3.14
4.61
1.00
0.33
0.75
1.08
4.94
5.39
4.50
0.63
4.83
1.42
2.57
1.50
1.50
3.70
2.20
1.00
2.00
0.50
2.60

TABLE 2. Comparison of Variance

Rati o
A 10- 1+
B< l0 - 1
;a, 1- 1

C< 2- l
;a,,1- 1
D > l-1

Rati o of Non As pirant Varian ce to Varian ce f or A spirant s
NON SOUTH
ALL
Scale Numb ers
Scale Numb ers
1, 3, 30, 35
1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 30, 35
2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16,
2, 4, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16,
19, 23, 24, 25, 26, 39
17, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25,
26, 29, 39
4, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18,
10, 11, 14, 18, 20, 22,
21, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32,
27, 28, 31, 32, 33, 38,
33, 38
40
11, 20, 27, 34, 36, 37, 40
34, 36, 37

Varianc e
S2
(11)

0.69
1.63
2.72
3.14
0.36
0.53
0.61
1.56
0.44
1.00
10.50
2.36
0.88
2.67
0. 17
1.05
0.89
5.93
0.41
0.81
0.49
1.00
0.25
0 .71
1.64
1.03
4.24
0.70
1.13
0.17
0.64
3.95
1. 71
2.58
0.20
1.33
1.00
1.17
0.75
0.80
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scores of 5.0 . Finally , Dimension 4, Federal Spending #1 , was concerned
with salaries for political officials in all three branches, increases in spending
for international development and also domestic programs including mass
transit , medicare and welfare. Six Senators had scores of6.0 and 7.0, McCarthy and Muskie were not scored , but Hartke gave least support for increased
spending with a score of 2. 0.
Summarizing then , Jackson contrasted with the other aspirants on support
for defense , space and military. Hartke and McCarthy did not support tax
reform , Harris joining them specifically on subsidy and depletion reforms.
Hartke also opposed increased federal spending . These deviations noted , the
aspirant Senators voted with substantial similarity .
Our theory offers no basis for predicting what direction aspirants will take
on the issues in comparison with other Senators. Inspection of the mean scale
scores for the three groups of Senators , all nonaspirants , nonaspirants outside
the South , and aspirants , does indicate order in the responses . The most
common pattern is the one that occurs on Dimension 1, States Rights . The
mean for all nonaspirants is 10.51 , the lowest mean reported on that dimension. Nonaspirants from outside the South have a mean score of 14. 79. The
mean for the aspirants is highest at 16.50. While the scores and the closeness
of the means vary from scale to scale , the order of the means for each of the
three groups is in this pattern on 25 of the 40 scales . The opposite pattern
describes nine of the 40 scales. For example , on Dimension 10, Financial
Conservatism , aspirants are the least conservative and have the lowest mean
score with 1.50. All nonaspirants have the highest mean score with 2.50 , and
the man for aspirants from outside the South falls between those of the other
groups with 2. 09. On the remaining six dimensions the order of the category
means is irregular .
DISCUSSION
We hypothesized that the aspirations of Democratic Senators , desirous of
the Presidency , would be reflected in their legislative voting. We expected
that the single national constituency would attract candidates with similar
policy positions to seek the presidency. Nonaspirants, on the other hand,
presumably would be voting in behalf of more parochial interests; responding
to regional , state or substate demands , specific groups or their personal
values. There would be more variance in their scale scores . The findings fit the
theory fairly well.
On most of the issue dimensions , aspirants voted more similarly on the
issues than nonaspirants, even when Southern Senators are excluded from the
comparison. Referring back to Table 2, we note that the ratios comparing
variance for these two sets of Senators are highest on Dimensions 1, 3, 30 and
35. These were certainly among the very controversial issues of the day.
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Twenty of the roll calls in Dimension 1 dealt with school integration and
bussing . Others dealt with direct election of the president and changing the
filibuster rule . Implicit in these issues is the struggle for nationalizing Ameri can politics at the expense of states rights . Clearly the Democrats choosing a
presidential nominee had little choice among the aspirants from the Senate .
The aspirants' mean score on the dimension was nearly the maximum possible , clearly favoring nationalization.
Dimension 3, the Humanitarian Dimension includes measures placing
high value on human dignity in and out of the United States - nonprolifica tion treaty , Youth Corps , restricting deployment of ABM's, providing a
federal legal service program , improving school lunch food services. Many of
these proposals were opposed by President Nixon, and there was substantial
variance in Democrat voting, but the candidates were very similar and consistently for extending human dignity , as our dimension measures it. Despite the
fact that these roll calls constitute a significant dimension of conflict among
fellow partisans , there was not much choice among the candidates' positions
on this dimension . The same point can be made about the Drug Control
Dimension (#30). All the aspirants were high scorers on the dimensions
favoring the removal of"no knock " warrants from the Dangerous Substances
Act, limiting the Attorney General's authority relative to enforcement and
easing penalties from marijuana enforcement. On Dimension 35, ational
Expenditures, the aspirants favored increased federal spending for urban
problems in Washington , D.C ., but less for foreign aid than recommended by
the administration - in short, supporting a change in priorities by spending
more on domestic problems and less on foreign aid .
Without a belabored discussion of more dimensions, th e point here is to
suggest that the development of consensus on the issues, often described as a
function carried out by the political party, 12 is on many substantive issues
largely anticipated by the aspirants. It remains true , of course, that differences
of style and emphasis may emerge in the campaign which are not
foreshadowed in the policy dimensions of Senate voting. Likewise , similar
candidates may encourage divergent types (such as Wallace ) to enter the fray.
Looking at our data what impresses us about the aspirants from the Senate is
their similarity on the dimensions rather than their differences. As explained
above , the most "different" of the aspirants was Senator Jackson , who was
widely and correctly regarded as more hawkish than the others. The major
contenders, Kennedy , Muskie and McGovern , and two darkhorses , Bayh and
Hughes , voted nearly alike on almost all the dimensions of Senate voting. 13
12
Marion D . Irish and Jam es W. Prothro , The Politics of American Democracy, 5th ed.
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall , 1971). " Looking first at latent functions of national conventions
for th e parties themselves, the most important is the creation or ratification of party consensus."
p. 313.
13
Our responde nt s are a universe of Democ ratic Senators for a given time and we have
catego rized th em into groups. Statistics for evaluating differences betwee n samples have no
application her e. To satisfy our own curiosity, however, we compa red the means of non-south em
aspirants and non-aspirants with an F tes t, finding the differences significant at the .05 level on
scales 5, 8, 12, 16, 24, 25, and 39.
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Comparison of the mean scale scores for each category of Senators indicates that the aspirant group mean is only occasionally between the mean
score for all nonaspirant Democrats and the mean for nonaspirants from
outside the South . Aspirant scores are either high or low on 35 of the 40 scales.
In several instances , the differ ences are substantial. The scales on which
mean differences were substantial are scales which contain two kinds of issues
-civil rights and tax reform. Let us quickly say that the differences occur only
on seven scales and that more dimensions have civil rights and tax reform roll
calls than these seven. Yet it is noteworthy that the aspirants exceed the
support of their non-southern collegaues on these issues . The aspirants
tended to be out in front of their party in their voting to equalize opportunities . On economic dimensions they sought to close tax loopholes and
provide family assistance. In a voter appeal sense, the aspirants were nearly
uniformly liberal , responding to or anticipating the interests of racial
minorities and the poor.
On only five scales could the aspirants' mean scores be thought of as
expressing a mediating position between the scores for southerners and
non-southerns (# 12, 32, 33, 38, and 40). In each instance, the means were
similar among all three groups. None constituted a matter of conspicuous
regional cleavage within the party. Despite the order of means, there is
nothing about the issues to suggest that the aspirants in fact played or attempted to achieve for themselves a position between the southern and nonsouthern Senators.
No aspirant consistently distinguished his position from the others in a
direction attractive to the South. Jackson 's voting on military spending was
like that of a number of southern Senators , but obviously he was more liberal
than Southerners on matters of social welfare, civil rights and tax issues. On a
range of issues, Hartke was more moderate than the other aspirants, but
evidenced no particular "Southern strategy" on his overall voting record .
McCarthy (who could not be placed on several dimensions because of nonparticipations ) was not as liberal as most aspirants on tax reform , but his
positions on most issues would not be attractive to the South.
Aspirants ' scale scores indicate no subtle or varying strategies by individuals to appeal to a unique coalition of interests to advance to the presidency.
Instead it would appear that most placed themselves on the is ues in a way that
would be generally acceptable to the presidential wing of the Democratic
Party . 14 Shades of distinction between the candidates were created more by
the styles of their campaigns than their voting records. If McGovern was more
attractive to the young than Muskie, it was not because of differences in their
Senate voting. We think ambitions for the Presidency help explain the similar14SeeJam es MacGregor Burns , Th e Deadloc k of Democrac y: Four-Party Politics in America
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall , Inc ., 1963, 1967), especially pp. 249-264.
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ity of candidates ' voting. It implies that they seek to satisfy or reflect a
consensus perceived in the national electorate or their own party . The development of such a consensus and how aspirants read it go beyond the limits
of our inquiry .
PREDICTIO S: COi G BEYOND OUR DATA
At this writing, nominations for President for 1976 have not been settled .
Obviously , however , presidential aspirants from the Senate have fared badly
in the proceedings . In the denouements of Agnew and Nixon, the previously
untried vice presidential appointment process brought a U.S. House member
to the presidency. The candidacies of others whose careers did not include
national offices proved to be robust. The most consistent losers were Senate
aspirants. Kennedy refused to run , and one by one Senators and former
Senators fell by the wayside: Mondale , Muskie , Bayh, Bentson , Harris,
Jackson , and Humphrey. Senator Church remains a darkhorse possibility ,
along with U.S. House aspirant Morris Udall. o Republican challenger arose
from the Senate.
Although it is possible that the public mood that nourished the campaigns
of Carter , Reagan and Brown may persist , and that their very success will
stimulate ambitions and support for candidacies by more governors , we
expect the Senate to be the most fertile soil for nurturing the aspirations of
future presidential candidates. Moreover , the impressive support achieved
by Jimmy Carter on a nationwide basis confirms our view that Southern
aspirants can be viable presidential candidates when they disclaim the traditional Southern racial values. We think this aspect of Carter's campaign is of
greater future significance than the fact that he is not a Senator. Senators,
including those from the Soqth , can be viable presidential aspirants , especially in the Democratic party . We expect them to be Senators who have voted
for nationalizing public policy rather than for defending states ' rights, for
spending relatively more on domestic social problems than on foreign aid or
military budgets , and for extending civil rights and equalizing economic
opportunities for minorities and the poor . Chances are we have not seen the
withering away of presidential aspirations among Senators such as Bayh ,
Church and Kennedy. Meanwhile others , including Stevenson, Tunney ,
Bumpers and Chiles, will not lightly foreswear candidacies because of the
events that shaped the presidential campaign of 1976.
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APPENDIX A. The Forty Scalable Clusters
NAME

COEFFICIENT
of
REPRODUCIBILITY

ISSUES
l. States Rights

.972

34

2. Partisan Dimension

.972

39

3. Humanitarian Dimension

.966

41

4. Federal Spending #1

.971

9

5. Equal Rights

.969

14

6. Economic & Welfare Spending

.964

22

7. Human Rights

.967

24

8. Equal Rights or Equal
Opportunities

.963

17

9. Federal Spending #2

.969

9

10. Financial Conservatism

.977

4

11. Anti-Military Expansionism

.968

16

12. Civil Rights

.972

11

NO . OF

Senate Rule 22, Direct
election of President ,
civil rights , equal
rights , busing, etc .
Political contribution
tax credit, equal time
provision , fixing
amount of money spent
in electronic media in
elections , minimum 5%
income tax, etc .
Nonproliferation treaty ,
ABM , Vietnam Policy,
Youth Corp , Federal legal
services, School Lunch
Program, etc .
Increase salaries for 3
branches of government,
money for mass transit ,
medicaid and welfare
spending , etc .
Voting rights , manpower
training , equal
opportunities , etc .
Hill-Burton prof;:am ,
urban renewal , ead Start ,
Social Security , HEW health
programs , etc .
Food stamps , OEO , local
initiative program , child
nutrition program, etc.
Philadelphia Plan , OEO
appropriations , child
Nutrition Act, etc.
Urban renewal funds ,
health research
spending , cost of John J.
Kennedy Center, etc.
Neighborhood Youth Corp. ,
Social Security , UN
building , etc.
Military spending and
assistance, CooperChurch Amendment , use of
herbicides in Vietnam,
etc.
Voting rights , nomination of Haynesworth ,
Philadelphia Plan , School
desegregation , etc .
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.962

16

.976

6

15. Dome tic Problems #2

.965

6

16. Tax Reform

.955

17.

ecurity Spending

.967

10

18. Taxpayers Savings or Congressional Budget Austerity

.950

10

19. Federal Salaries

.991

4

20. Human

.980

4

21. Contemporary Reform

.979

6

22. Protectionism

.970

5

23. Reform #1

.956

6

24. Reform #2

.973

6

25. Civil Right

.945

9

13. Domestic Problems # l

14.

ational

ecurity

ational

eeds

Scrn CE

Consumer protection ,
postal reorganization ,
unemployment and manpower training , drug
abu e , etc .
Troop levels in Vietnam,
military purchases ,
national security
requirements, etc .
Social Security Benefits, surtax extension ,
highway safety , etc.
Oil depletion allowance ,
minimum income tax,
funding SST, etc.
Military procurement ,
Cooper-Church Amendment , etc .
ASA Budg t, space
shuttle , military
assistanc e, defense
spending , etc .
Salaries of federal
employe es and Vi e
President and certain
members of Congress .
OEO programs , elect
Committee on utrition ,
etc.
Oil depletion , taxes ,
Social Security benefits ,
etc .
Civil servic e, import
restrictions , etc .
Drug control , ecology,
etc.
Taxes , Family Assistance Plan , gun control ,
etc .
Equal employment
op rtunities , "Philade phia Plan ,"
desegregation of
chools , etc.
Ecology , drug control ,
retirement benefits ,
etc.
Investment credit , tax
loopholes, etc .
Grants to medical
schools, drug control,
etc .
Agricultural Price
Supports , taxes ,
Vietnam war , etc .

61

26. Mass Society Problems

.958

27. Tax Reform #2

.954

7

28. Public Health Problem

.970

5

29. "Status Quo "

.962

5
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30. Drug Control

.948

5

31. Public Reform

.990

4

32. Taic Subsidy Reform
(gas & minerals )

.973

5

33. Federal Spending &
Retirement

.983

4

34. Competitive Navy Repair
Contracts
35. National Ex~nditures
(Foreign Ai & D.C .)
36. Rights and Privileges

.988

5

.959

4

.980

4

37. Newspaper Preservation

.988

4

38. Reorganization Reform

.993

4

39. Minority Rights

.965

4

40. Worker's Problems

.970

4

"Dangerous drugs ,"
"no-knock " warrants ,
etc .
Agricultural policy ,
taices on cooperatives ,
Indian lands , etc.
Oil ,
recious
meta , an mineral
depletion allowance ,
etc .
Appropriations , funding
SST, and retirement
for judges , etc .
Navy ship repair
contracts .
Money for foreign aid
and for D .C.
Protection of rights
and privileges.
Preservation of newspapers and anti-trust
laws.
Postal reform , Congressional committee
reform , etc .
Voting rights , unemrcioyment compensation
or migrant workers,
etc.
Railway strike , mine
safety, etc .
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